OBJECTIVE -To evaluate diabetes outcomes under a national "pay-for-performance" program.
I
n England, a novel system of contractual financial incentives, called the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), has been introduced to reward family practices for achieving clinical targets across a range of conditions, including diabetes (1) . Up to one-third of practice income may be derived from the QOF, with diabetes accounting for nearly 10% of all incentives. Data are extracted from general practice computer systems on 31 March each year, and the most recent diabetes indicator measures are used to evaluate targets (2) . We aimed to evaluate trends in the achievement of intermediate outcome targets following the introduction of pay-for-performance in 2004.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS -Administrative QOF data describing performance of family practices under the program were analyzed for the years 2004 -2008 (3) . Data for each family practice included the number of registered diabetic subjects, the proportion of eligible subjects who achieved the targets, and the proportion of diabetic subjects excluded from evaluation of each target as "exceptions." Exceptions arise because practices are permitted to identify some individuals as ineligible for evaluation if the target is regarded as clinically inappropriate (4) . The targets included in this report were the percent of diabetic subjects with the last A1C Յ7.5%, with last blood pressure Յ145/85 mmHg, or with the last measured total cholesterol Յ5 mmol/l. We estimated the total number of registered diabetic subjects, the total number excluded as ineligible, and the number (and percent) of subjects who achieved the target after allowing for exclusions. The linear association between outcomes and year was estimated using robust standard errors to allow for repeated measures.
RESULTS -Data were analyzed for family practices in England that remained independent and had more than 750 registered patients or more than 500 patients per doctor, in the study year. The estimated annual increase in percent of diabetes subjects achieving targets was 3.03% (95% CI 2.95-3.10; P Ͻ 0.001) for the A1C target, 3.26% (3.18 -3.34; P Ͻ 0.001) for the blood pressure target, and 3.99% (3.92-4.07; P Ͻ 0.001) for the cholesterol target.
The total number of diabetic subjects in England achieving the A1C target, after allowing for exclusions from assessment, CONCLUSIONS -In the U.K., the care of subjects with type 2 diabetes is increasingly undertaken outside of specialist clinics by family physicians and practice nurses in primary care. This has led to concerns that some patients may experience poor-quality care (6) . The new national contract for family practices introduced in 2004 appears to have achieved favorable results in its initial year (4,7) and may have contributed to reducing socioeconomic inequalities in care (8, 9) .
The overall level of achievement of diabetes targets increased over 4 years. Lower-performing practices have shown the greatest improvements, and regional variations in care have reduced. There has been a substantial increase in the proportion of all diabetic subjects achieving intermediate outcome targets. In our previous report (7), we analyzed clinical data from individual patient records for 26 practices during the period of 2000 -2003 that gave results consistent with administrative data from the QOF. Two other reports, including data from the first or second years of QOF, suggest that QOF data are consistent with audits of individual patient records (10, 11) .
In a single group study, without any control practices, it is not possible to conclude that pay-for-performance incentives caused the observed changes. Other development efforts may have been influential. There was already evidence of improving quality of care before the introduction of QOF (7, 12) . The QOF targets are designed for audit rather than best practice, and practitioners may be utilizing clinical practice guidelines that recommend more stringent targets. Recommendations for a widespread use of statins were introduced in many countries at the start of this period, leading to improvements even in the absence of pay-forperformance. The greater improvement of low-performing practices may, in part, be accounted for by a ceiling effect, which restricted the potential improvement in highperforming practices. We caution that it is not clear that proposed benefits from payfor-performance would be observed if this model is adopted in systems with different organizational arrangements and models of practitioner remuneration. Data are percents of registered diabetic subjects at each practice except where indicated. N, total number of diabetic subjects across all practices; n, total number with trait across all practices. *Data are frequencies; †data are practice-specific percents of eligible diabetic subjects; ‡subjects excluded through "exception reporting" were assumed not to have achieved target.
